ble, expense, and hazard of a Convention, we may then enter upon the highly in portant and preilous experiment. But unless we do labor under some great practical inconveniences, and there is a moral certainty of gaining in portant advantages, the prudent and safe course seems to be, to permit things to remain as they are.

By way of removing the apprehensions which an unlimited Convention is well calculated to excite, we are told, that that body, when assembled, will be restricted to the consideration of the adoption or rejection of the articles proposed by the resolutions. disposed to doubt the validity of any restrictions which this Legislature can impose. The delegates in Convention will represent the people in their sovereign capacity, and derive their authority from them, not us. The Legislature itself is the creature of the people. Can the creature control the creator? This would be inverting the laws of nature. Should the people impose restrictions upon their delegates, they ought, in the nature of things, to be binding, and would be so regarded. But we have no security that they will obey any restrictions which we may recommend-I will not say impose. To pass the resolutions therefore, may be, to create a body, having power to do any thing, not physically impossible, and to render insecure the whole of our existing institutions. When there is a probability of this, and the manner in which the delegates are proposed to be elected is such that the West will have an overpowering influence, can the East and Cape-Fear hesitate for a moment to reject them?

In this body, which has assembled for the ordinary purposes of legislation only, each section of the State is so represented as to possess in some measure, the means of self protection—neither the East, West nor Cape-Fear can do any thing within themselves. But if we sanction the resolutions, a body will be convened for purposes vitally interesting—to make laws for future Legislatures themselves, in which the West will be more strongly represented than the East and Cape-Fear combined, and may secure to herself whatever portion of political power she may think proper.

If we ever consent to a Convention to be thus composed, I trust we will not do so when there is so much cause for excitement as at present. Now, not only the question of Convention for an alteration of the Constitution, but also for the removal of the Seat of Government, agitates the public mind. We saw the excitement to which the discussion of the Appropriation bill gave rise the other day, and we see the feeling which this subject is likely to occasion. Pass the resolutions, and that feeling and excitement will be conseed in a tenfold degree throughout the State. The companity will be convulsed from one extremity to the other. In the widst of this tunult and confusion, the elections will come on; and those can-